ABSTRACT The security of the cryptographic protocols has always been important to ensure proper implementation of a protocol. To assure protocol security, a number of works for analysis and verification of cryptographic protocols have emerged in the literature. In this paper, with dynamic epistemic logic, we propose a model approach to analyze a cryptographic protocol. In order to capture the security properties of the protocol, we present the update of the epistemic states based on the epistemic actions. The epistemic actions lead to changes in the knowledge set of the agents participating in the protocol. We model this execution process of the specific example of the cryptographic protocol using the Kripke models and the transition between states. The result of analysis demonstrates that this cryptographic protocol conforms to the security requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
The design and analysis of cryptographic protocols have always been a difficult problem. Various analytical methods have been proposed for security analysis. Among these methods, logical methods play a very important role. The most famous example is Dolev-Yao model [1] , in which a defect in this cryptographic protocol was discovered by logic analysis. In our work, we employ the dynamic epistemic logic to analyze cryptographic protocols. Our main goal is to develop a model for cryptographic protocol with change knowledge of agents by action update. In many literatures, authors often used logical reasoning to analyze and prove the security of the protocol (e.g., [2] - [4] ). Our analysis differs from these existing methods. Since Kripke models express epistemic, we employ the Kripke model to describe knowledge's change of agent by epistemic action update in the process of protocol execution. Our analysis result conforms to the design concept of cryptographic protocols and can make sure that only the right agents can know the right information.
Compared with traditional analysis methods such as the BAN logic [2] , Failures Divergences Refinement Checker (FDR) [5] , and modular framework [6] , we use Kripke models to present knowledge of agents by relations between
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Mamoun Alazab. possible worlds with actions. We give syntax and semantics of this model for a security protocol. We emphasize possible epistemic actions in all states. We exploit properties and axioms under this semantics and apply it to a specific example. Our work is summarized as follows:
• Applying the dynamic epistemic logic, we describe a specific cryptographic protocol. We enrich the epistemic logic with dynamic actions to depict actions that result to change of the information set of agents involved in this protocol. A typical expression [σ ] φ in the Kripke model, that illustrates: after run of the actin σ in protocol, φ holds. In this protocol, we stipulate the action sending as action that gives rise to update of knowledge.
• We give syntax and corresponding semantics of this Kripke model for the cryptographic protocol. Update function describes that set of agents is changed by receiving information. On the other hand, this also illustrates that knowledge of agents is changed by the epistemic action. The protocol is completely formalized. This fully demonstrates the powerful expressive power of epistemic logic for security protocols.
• The protocol is to communicate a secret between two agents who have only own key in an insecure network. We assume an attacker who can eavesdrop all the communication data through this channel. By analysis for all possibly actions and epistemic indistinguishabilities, run process of this protocol is displayed step by step. By action description, we analyse the protocol in detail and intuitively. Change of information set depends on action update.
• The merit of our approach is: the whole execution process of protocol is described succinctly and intuitively. It has no complicated formulas and only uses of epistemic actions. The result of the analysis demonstrates that this protocol satisfies the security requirements: the right agents know the right things. Our analysis is successful. The rest of paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates related work about our topic. In section 3, we introduce some background knowledge and preliminaries about the epistemic logic we will use. Section 4 represents how update the epistemic information set of agents. In section 5, we develop syntax of a logical language to describe cryptographic protocol. Section 6 illustrates semantics related to the syntax and properties about the semantics of the language. Section 7 describes an example of cryptographic protocol. Finally, we summarize our work and propose some interesting research problems for the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The design of cryptographic protocols is a challenge. To find the flaws, many logical methods were used, for example the famous BAN logic used in [2] and [7] , theorem proving [8] , model checking [9] , rewrite [10] and so on. Most existed protocol verifiers with model checking devote to explore the state space, that result to verify relatively simple protocols by very large resources. In order for termination of the verification process, they have to limit the numbers of run of the protocol. If the protocol is with much more runs, the bug will not be checked. As a result, a finite-state model checking is provided by Lowe [5] . One of the standard staticanalysis ideas is typed process calculus. There are many papers that track the structure of values and process, also give security information by type process system [11] - [15] . So far, nevertheless, static analyses are restricted to operate on data case by case, especially, on cryptographic data. Therefore, in paper [16] , they propose a general treatment of these operations and two main aims are achieved. Depending on a typed process calculus, typed system is a generic type system which can express and prove secrecy properties of security protocols with many cryptographic operations. Based on the untyped logic programs, they propose a precise definition of a protocol checker and discussed its properties. And then, established an equivalence relation between the typed system and logic-programming tool. Process calculus is a typically method this is widely used in many papers [17] - [19] .
Theoretical proof is also a commonly used method, in which paper [8] is the most representative. Symbolic examination of the protocol is presented by inductive proof. Analysis process is executed step by step. The reasoning displays the process of protocol running in various circumstances. Thayer et al. [20] , Guttman and Thayer [21] , and Guttman [22] propose a strand space model. This method draws on inductive thoughts and describes cryptography protocol by graph. The strand space consists of strand of various legal agents and strand of adversaries. The approach of strand is still developing.
Model checking is also a universally method for verifying the correctness of cryptography protocol. The paper [23] emphasizes belief change in protocol verification. Epistemic logics are employed to represent the belief of each agent in a given protocol for protocol verification. They reason by belief evolution operators for a specific protocol. Reasoning in protocols is that agents could have incorrect belief, and they resolve these belief without lapsing into inconsistency. Gattinger and Van Eijck [24] employ the Kripke model to model knowledge of large numbers and describe cryptographic protocols. They also use dynamic epistemic logic to denote communication and computation in a multi-agent system. Diffie-Hellman key exchange is an example they formalized. Using the key exchange as a benchmark, they present register models for the model checking and compare against a standard algorithm.
Paper [25] proposes an abstract logical architecture by a virtual coding and decoding agent for simulation encryption and decryption. They model the agent sending or receiving message by introducing additional, virtual, agents, so that they can model one-way-function aspects of computation as constraints on the communication between principals and these virtual counterparts. The proposed model in a dynamic epistemic model checker is called DEMO.
In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has been applied to the analysis and verification of cryptography protocols [24] , [25] . However, no existing method is omnipotent. The specific protocol should be specially analyzed. So, we employ dynamic epistemic logic to develop a analysis system for checking security of cryptographic protocol.
III. PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
In this section we briefly introduce some background knowledge and preliminaries about the epistemic logic we will use. At first, we give some basic concepts of logic.
Definition 1 (Proposition Logic): Let P be a set of proposition variables or atoms. The most simplicity formula of basic propositional language is expressed by the smallest class as follows:
It displays that a formula is either a proposition variable p ∈ P, a negated formula, or a disjunction of formulas. That is to say, if ϕ is a formula, then ¬ϕ is. If ϕ is a formula, then ϕ ∨ ϕ is also. Propositonal formula do not involve epistemic information. We give a logic language for epistemic actions. We employ model logical system S5 (reflexive and euclidian) as epistemic system and the basic model is Kripke model.
Definition 2 (Kripke Model):
A Kripke model M = W , R, V is a structure, in which Relation R is equivalence relation. W denotes a non-empty set of worlds or states, or points. In security protocol, W denotes states in the execution of the protocol. R ⊆ W ×W is reflexive, iff (if and only if), for all a, a ∈ A (A is a finite set of agents), and
V is the valuation map defined as follows: V : P → 2 W , where fact p ∈ P, and if
In the epistemic model, K is acted as a modal operator. K a ϕ is read as: agent a knows ϕ. ¬K a ϕ denotes agent a do not know ϕ. In Kripke model as figure 1 
According to this property, their axioms can be denoted as:
A1 says if agent a knows ϕ then ϕ is true. A2 says if a knows ϕ then a knows that a knows ϕ. A3 says if a does not know ϕ then a knows a does not know ϕ.
In our formulas, K a ϕ and K a ¬ϕ cannot exist at the same time for all formulas ϕ. This can produce a problem: with the increasing of set of knowledge, how to deal with inconsistent information? In the cryptographic protocol, we stipulate the most fresh information has priority and the corresponding inconsistent information automatically eliminate for preserving consistent belief set. We cite the AGM-approach [26] , [27] in belief revision (belief set is a set of propositional formulas). These two operations can be expressed as:
⊕ ϕ means expansion of with ϕ, that is ϕ is added to the belief set .
ϕ denotes contraction of with ϕ , that is ϕ is removed from .
ϕ means revision of with ϕ, that is is incorporated by new information ϕ. Revising a belief set with new (contradictory) information ϕ, at first, we make space for ϕ by deleting everything that contradicts it (that is, ¬ϕ), and then, we can safely add ϕ. That is to say, the agent's belief always keeps consistent. Here, we apply belief sets to knowledge sets. Therefore, we have
Especially, nested model operator K b K a ϕ does not imply K b ϕ in our cryptographic protocol. For example, agent b knows a knows a secret or key, but b does not know the specific content of the secret or value of key. With the execution of program, knowledge of agents always increases, instead of decreases. A run of program is a finite serial of states w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , ..., w n . For all j ≤ (n − 1), we use I a (w j ) to denote the set of knowledge of agent a in state w j . So, we have I a (w j ) ⊆ I a (w j+1 ), in which, some knowledge is from assumption of the initiate state, some knowledge is from received information or by computing the information he has obtained.
For the types of update knowledge, we take three cases into account: (i) sending a message, (ii) private knowing of a variable by computing, and (iii) private knowing about the knowledge of other agents by reasoning. The first type is that agent a sends a message to another agent b on insecure network, then all agents in this network get the message. This is equivalent to public announcement. If this network is a secure network, only agent b can obtain this message, then b's knowledge can be updated. This is the second type. 
IV. EPISTEMIC UPDATE
In this section we illustrate some types of update in detail. At first, we introduce some types of model change. And then, we describe various update approaches of epistemic.
A. CRYPTOGRAPHY PRIMITIVES
In cryptography, a message m can be name of agent a, or random number n, or a key k, else a encrypted data or its concatenating. We can define it as:
m k denotes a message m encrypted with key k. (m, m) denotes a concatenation of two messages. There are some rules determining which messages an agent can construct from his information set:
In the above expressions, the conditions are above the line, and the results are below the line. The first one says, if an agent has message m and a key k in his information set, he should be able to construct m k . The others are similar and will not be described.
B. UPDATE FUNCTION
Anyone can get the message which is sent by agent a to agent b (a = b) on an insecure network. Therefore, we take this message which is sent as a broadcast and any agent can get it. We need an update operation to describe the set of agents that is changed by the message transmission. We assume that M denotes a set of message. The group gr(M) denotes set of VOLUME 7, 2019 agents that can get the M, where gr(M) ⊆ A (A is a finite set of agents). Variable x denotes a message without encryption. I a denotes information set or possess set of agent a. ∅ denotes null. {m} k denotes message m is encrypted under key k, where k is key. (m, m ) denote any two messages concatenating. According to construction rules above, the update operation is defined as:
end. UPDATE is a recursive calling algorithm. There have three cases according to types of message when algorithm is executing. The update function above is to update the set of agents who possess message. In our model, knowledge update of agents is based on a formula ϕ and a set of agents B. Roorda et al. [28] have given this function. Here, we cite and extend the definition for multi-agent.
In this section, we develop a logical language L C (A, P) to describe cryptographic protocol, where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of atomic propositions, C denotes about cryptography. Dynamic epistemic actions will be added to it. The facts in programma cannot be changed, although the knowledge of agents involved may be changed by actions. The syntax for L C (A, P) is given.
Definition 4 (Formulas, Actions): The language L C (A, P) consists of the formulas L stat C (A, P) and the actions L act C (A, P), defined by
where p ∈ P, a ∈ A, B ⊆ A. In the above formulas, variables are stipulated as: φ ∈ L stat C (A, P), σ ∈ L act C (A, P). stat means static formulas and act means dynamic action. C B φ means φ is common knowledge in group B.
[σ ]φ is defined as after executing of action σ , φ holds.
Action S stands for sending, and the construction S a p is called as agent a sends that p. [S a p]φ is interpreted by: after the agent a sends p, φ holds. Action (σ σ ) is sequential execution-'first do σ , then do σ ', and (σ σ ) = (σ σ ). This is because executing actions in different orders may result in different consequence. Action (σ ∨ σ ) is non-deterministic choice between σ and σ .
VI. SEMANTICS A. BASIC DEFINITIONS
The logic language L C (A, P) is to emphasize for multi-agent epistemic logic. We employ S5(A, P) to present the class of epistemic states for agents A and atoms P. More clearly, dynamic modal formula [σ ]φ is interpreted as after execution of action σ , φ holds, where σ is an action and φ is a formula. Combining models for different groups of agents, we employ group gr(M ) = A to describe a set of agents A for a multiagent epistemic model M or say the agents of model M is A. Due to executing of an epistemic action, domain of an epistemic state is often enlarged or restricted. The question is how do we determine which are indistinguishable for an agent? For describing this, we give two concepts between epistemic states.
Definition 5 (Bisimulation): Given M = W , R, V and M = W , R , V be two models. A non-empty binary relation ⊆ W × W is a bisimulation iff for all w ∈ W , w ∈ W , (w, w ) ∈ , and the following conditions hold:
• for all a ∈ A (A is a set of agents), v ∈ W , if (w, v) ∈ R a , then there exists v ∈ W , such that (w , v ) ∈ R a and (v, v ) ∈ .
• for all a ∈ A, v ∈ W , if (w , v ) ∈ R a , then there exists v ∈ W , such that (w, v) ∈ R a and (v, v ) ∈ . If M linking w and M linking w are bisimulation, then we call (M , w) and (M , w ) bisimilar, and write as (M , w)↔(M , w ).
If two states are bisimulation, then two states after epistemic update still preserve bisimulation, because action execution preserves bisimulation and epistemic update dependents on action execution.
Definition 6 (Equivalence of Epistemic States): Let M , M be two models, and M
At the first case, from the agent's point of view, the epistemic states are indistinguishable if he does not occur in the epistemic states. Both the equivalence of two states and modulo bisimilarity are same for this agent. We infer that from this definition:
This relationship in the Kripke modal is defined as equivalence relation. If all the relations R a in M are equivalence relations, then the M is called epistemic model. In this situation, we write ∼ a rather than R a , and we denote the model as M = W , ∼, V .
We introduce a concept of precondition that we will use. An action can only execute on the worlds or states which satisfy the preconditions of it.
Definition 7 (Precondition): A condition of action execution is as the precondition of an epistemic action. The precondition Pre is inductively defined as: (M , w) .
Definition 8 (Semantics of Formulas and Actions):
Let M = W , ∼, V and M ∈ S5(A, P), w ∈ W . The semantics of L stat C (A, P) formulas and L act C (A, P) action is defined by M , w | p iff w ∈ V (p) M , w | ¬φ iff M , w | φ M , w | φ ∧ χ iff M , w | φ and M , w | χ M , w | K a φ iff for all w ∈ W : w ∼ a w implies M , w | φ M , w | C B φ iff for all w ∈ W : w ∼ B w implies M , w | φ M , w | [σ ]φ iff M , w | Pre[σ ], for all M , w : (M , w)[[σ ]](M , w ) implies M , w | φ M , w | [S a p]φ iff M , w | K a p, for all M , w : (M , w)[[S a p]](M , w ) implies M , w | φ [[σ ; σ ]] = [[σ ]] • [[σ ]] [[σ ∨ σ ]] = [[σ ]] ∨ [[σ ]] [[σ ]] means epistemic action σ is executable. (M , w)[[σ ]] denotes epistemic action σ is executable in
B. PROPERTIES OF SEMANTICS

Proposition 1 (Algebra Properties of Action
Proof: According to relational algebra, properties of the first two equations (4) are obvious. We only proof (5), because the others are similar.
Theorem 1: If an agent cannot distinguish resulting states from each other, then their original states also are not be distinguished.
Proof: According to semantics of actions 'sending', and (M , w ) ∼ a (M , u ). These epistemic states are equivalent and the accessible relationship is established only if their origins (M , w) and (M , u) are same for the agent. So, w ∼ a u.
VII. ANALYSIS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL
In this section, we give an example of cryptographic protocol for applying above epistemic logic. Two agents (Alice (a) and Bob (b)) want to exchange a secret over some communication channels. At first, we assume that Alice is the only one who knows the important secret for example if a fact p holds or not. Alice and Bob have their own encryption key, k a and k b , respectively. In this situation, the encryption key can be arbitrary key, for instance, a symmetric key or a pair of public-private key. But any one can only decrypt the encryption data which is encrypted by himself. And others have no the relevant decryption key. Alice and Bob are honest and can follow the process of the protocol in the running of this protocol. The channel is not secure. An attacker Catch (c) can eavesdrop all the communication data through this channel. We assume that the outside attacker is a weak intruder. Excepting eavesdropping, Catch cannot do anything especially decrypt the data because he has no the relevant decryption key.
The process of this protocol is following:
Step1: Alice encrypts the secret p or ¬p with her own key k a , and then sends to Bob.
Step2: After receiving the information, Bob encrypts this data with his own key k b and sends to Alice.
Step3: Received the data, Alice decrypts that and sends it to Bob. Bob can decrypt the message after received it and learn the content of secret because the encryption is commutative. So far, the sending action ends online. Bob can get the secret p or ¬p. In this protocol, we employ the encryption is commutative, namely: {{m} k a } k b = {{m} k b } k a , in which {m} k a denotes message m is encrypted with k a , {{m} k a } k b denotes after encryption with k a , message {m} k a is encrypted with k b again.
We give a information set for every agent. I a denotes information set of agent a. In the initiate state, I a = {p, k a }, I b = {k b }, I c = ∅. We call the epistemic model for this protocol as Crypto. We model this protocol as an epistemic state with atom p, denoting the secret fact, and ¬p that denoting other secrets. In a broad sense, p denotes a secret fact while ¬p denotes anything else. And it is known that Alice knows p or ¬p in the initiate state. In this scenario, the common knowledge is that Bob and Catch are both uncertain about the value of p and they both know Alice knows the secret is p or ¬p. We assume this secret is p, that is to say, in fact, Alice knows p but Bob and Catch are ignorant about this. It is described as: It can be interpreted as: Alice, Bob and Catch know that either Alice knows p or Alice knows ¬p and this is a common knowledge. But in fact, Alice knows p. The alternative is marked by the exclamation. This state is as Figure 2 . We employ ovals to represent worlds in a kripke model.
In this figure, secret fact p holds in • state, and ¬p holds in
• state. Also, • denotes false 0 and • denotes true 1. The fact point of epistemic state is underlined. According to this protocol, Alice encrypts p or ¬p, then sends the encrypted message to Bob. This also conforms to our construction rules in cryptography. Alice has p and k a , and then she can construct {p} k a . We employ S to present this action. (S a p a ) means agent Alice sends p a . An outsider Catch can intercept the message. For simplicity, these encryption message {p} k a and {¬p} k a can be described as p a or ¬p a . At the following, I a = {p, k a , p a }. Bob and Catch can get the message, but they still do not know whether it is p a or ¬p a , because they have no relevant key. Applying That is to say, only Alice knows she sends p a or ¬p a . In effect, she sends p a as Figure 3 . We employ boxes to represent actions that take place and that transform kripke models. And that is called ''action update". For all actions, only one of more options is executed.
After receiving this message, according to protocol, Bob encrypts it with his own key k b and sends it to Alice. This also conforms to the construction rules. Similarly, Catch may eavesdrop this message. This message that is encrypted by Bob can be depicted succinctly as:
This action can be depicted in Figure 4 . Especially, Bob encrypts and sends the data but he do not know the value of the original data. , p a , p ab , p b , p},  I c = {p a , p ab , p b }, I a = {p, k a , p a , p ab , p b }. Therefore, after execution of this protocol, only Alice and Bob learn the secret p. The outside attacker Catch still do not learn the secret. This resulting state can be depicted as:
Eventually, the secret fact from Alice is transmitted to Bob while the value of p cannot be obtained by the outside attacker Catch. In other words, after execution of this protocol, the secret can be known by agent Alice and Bob but not the outsider attacker.
The epistemic model for this cryptographic protocol we call Crypto. Figure 3 presents Figure 5 . The figure of the epistemic change for process of cryptographic protocol is presented in Figure 6 . At the last second state, b and c cannot distinguish the two resulting states because before executing a series of actions, b and c also cannot distinguish the two original states. This conforms to Theorem 1. At last, b decrypts the p b and knows p. Furthermore, c is impossible to know p and he knows data that all is encrypted data in the light of his information set.
Therefore, finally, we have
That is to say, after execution of this protocol actions, Alice and Bob know the secret p and this is a common knowledge while the attacker Catch does not know.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have given a model language based on dynamic epistemic logic to present execution of cryptography protocol. The language consists of static formulas and dynamic epistemic actions that results change of knowledge of agents involved in the protocol. The semantics of the language is represented by Kripke models that describe the possible actions. Changes in the epistemic state display the execution of the protocol. By epistemic actions, information sets of agents in this system change applying update rules. We apply logic language to the specific example of a cryptography protocol with epistemic action. We analyse the protocol in detail and intuitively based on epistemic action. The biggest advantage of our approach is simple and intuitive and has no complicated theory to represent the protocol only by action update. The result of the analysis demonstrates this protocol satisfies the security requirement: the right agents know the right things.
There are several ideas that should be a research point for future work. The first one is to build up a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic language of security protocol. The second one is to develop an automatically epistemic logic tool for security verification and as a general epistemic modeling tool to check some security protocols. This is a challenge work. The third one but not the last is that we can simulate various possible attack models and model these models and further test the security of the protocol. In fact, there are still many aspects worth studying, and we won't go into details. 
